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Two cases have been developed to examine the concept of
assigning to a Navy Laboratory the management responsibility
for the development of an air-to-air missile system. The
first case examines the organizational relationships and
operational difficulties that have resulted from this
"field development" concept. The second case discusses the
Management Review, a program control technique used by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, to examine some related
problems created by this different development approach. A
teaching commentary is included to assist the instructor in
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis began with the intent of developing case
studies concerning the Exploratory and Advanced Development
phases of the weapon system life cycle. The authors chose
this area because of its importance on the development and
production of a weapon system. Early research highlighted
several subjects for investigation as potential case study
material to portray the "real world" environment. Further
research resulted in a two-part case study involving an
air-to-air missile program and its associated development
problems. The first case deals with the organizational dif-
ficulties encountered when a field activity is given the
total management responsibility for a missile system develop-
ment. The second case deals with the events and decisions
leading up to a Management Review of the program and the
resultant memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
In an effort to maintain a degree of anonymity for the
persons and organizations involved, fictional names were used
in the cases. In some instances actions and decisions attri-
buted to one person were actually made by others, but
throughout an effort was made not to change their impact.
This was considered necessary in order to clarify and empha-
size the important points of the cases. These points have
been highlighted in the teaching commentary which is included
as an aid in discussing the case.

II. THE BENDER MISSILE: PROGRAM ORIENTATION
In the mid and late sixties, actual air-to-air combat
situations pointed out the need for improving our air-to-air
missile capability. In response to this need a Tentative
Specific Operational Requirement (TSOR) was issued for the
development of a weapon system designated QUICKSHOT. A
Proposed Technical Approach (PTA) prepared jointly by the
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) and the Naval Weapons
Center (NWC) responded with a short-term RATTLER Missile
product improvement program. During this period of time the
Weapons Center conducted NAVAIR-funded Exploratory Develop-
ment of such proposed missile concepts as CAT and the
advanced seeker designs that eventually evolved into the
BENDER Missile.
Shortly after the submission of the Navy PTA, the Air
Force offered another answer to the air-to-air missile prob-
lem. They suggested the AIM-605, an Air Force project, as
a possible candidate for joint service use. The Navy held
to a position that the immediate need could best be met by a
modified RATTLER with an Initial Operational Capability (IOC)
of two years from that time. The AIM-605, which was in
Advanced Development, and the BENDER were further downstream.
A joint study by the Air Force and the Navy to determine the
interim missile configuration found the RATTLER modification
to yield the lowest development cost as well as a shorter
time to IOC.

Almost two years after the TSOR was issued joint Air
Force-Navy recommendations regarding the development of air-
to-air missiles for joint service use were presented to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) . These recommenda-
tions were in line with the Secretary of Defense's (SECDEF)
stated policy to reduce the proliferation of weapon systems
that perform essentially the same mission. The recommenda-
tions were that the Navy would develop the improved RATTLER
and the Air Force's AIM-605 program would be terminated.
The Air Force would pursue high energy laser technology while
the Navy would be the lead service for development of the
BENDER Missile. The Air Force was to fund the first year of
the proposed two year development of the improved RATTLER
with funds from the cancelled AIM-605 program. These recom-
mendations were concurred with by DEPSECDEF and resulted in
a Development Concept Paper being issued four months later.
The program is undergoing Advanced Development and
includes work on a back-up version of the BENDER Missile.
The primary version (referred to as the Vectored BENDER) is
highly maneuverable and has a firing envelope that is greatly
increased over the current RATTLER. These two characteristics
are pushing the "state-of-the-art" in air-to-air missile
development and therefore the Vectored BFNDER is considered
to be a high risk system. The back-up version (referred to
as the Dynamic BENDER) presents an increased performance
capability over the improved RATTLFR but does not incorporate
all the new and advanced items of the Vectored BENDER. The

Dynamic BENDER does not possess the entire performance
capability of the Vectored BENDER, but it is a considerably
lower risk system to develop. The outward appearance of the
two missiles evident in Exhibits (II-l) and (II-2) is quite
different. The Dynamic BENDER has an appearance similar to
the RATTLER, while the Vectored BENDER owes its unusual









III. THE BENDER MISSILE; AN ORGANIZATIONAL CASE STUDY
A. CASE BACKGROUND
The decade of the sixties was a period of significant
technological advancement for major weapon systems. For
example, aircraft that could destroy targets without visual
acquisition and missiles/bombs guided by radar, television,
and finally lasers were no longer "Buck Rogers," but a
reality. Unfortunately this expertise did not carry over to
managing the acquisition of these complex systems. In fact,
during the early part of the decade cost overruns , schedule
delays, and quality defects were quite common. In addition
to these problems, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert
McNamara was convinced that defense planning had become too
fragmented. He felt it was only meeting the needs of the
individual services and nobody was looking at the big picture.
In an attempt to rectify the situation he planned a two-fold
approach. First, he decided to shift much of the risk of
system acquisition to the contractor in order to incentivize
him towards better management. This was primarily accomplished
via a policy of fixed price contracts and total package pro-
curement. Secondly, to give a broader view to the problems
of defense, he implemented policies which centralized





By the late sixties it became apparent that these pro-
cedures were not the answer. Too often OSD became too
deeply involved in second-guessing the Services and over-
riding decisions. In fact, some programs were almost taken
over by OSD which was bad because modern programs were just
too large and complex for this type of intervention. Once
again the Services found themselves hamstrung in the acquisi-
tion process by a myriad of management problems centered
around cost overruns, schedule delays, and quality defects.
In addition, the military had lost much of its earlier public
support and Congressional inquiries were becoming more
numerous and detailed. The examples, such as the F-lll and
C-5A, were extremely damning.
Along with the new administration in 1969 came a fresh
outlook on the old problems of system acquisition management.
The new DEPSECDEF, David Packard, gave his analysis of the
situation in his memorandum of 28 May 1970. It has served
as a basis for current DOD system acquisition policy which
was officially promulgated in 1971 as DOD Directive 5000.1.
The directive recognized the need for improved management in
the acquisition of new systems and attempted to apply
2generally accepted management principles to this process.
DODD 5000.1 is included as Appendix A.
2 . . .Listed below are some of the more important provisions
of DODD 5000.1 pertinent to program management organization:
1) The key factors in successful system acquisition are
competent people, rational priorities, and clearly defined
responsibilities
.
2) Responsibility and authority for the acquisition of
12

Mr. Packard summed up the intent of his new policies this
way
:
What we are proposing is very simple: major acquisition
programs will turn out better if they are managed better.
There is no better way to improve the management of a
program than to get a better manager and give him the
responsibility and authority to manage.
3
For a number of years the Navy's approach to the develop-
ment of air-to-air/ground missiles has been through a Naval
Development Laboratory located at the Naval Weapons Center,
China Lake, California. In addition to the laboratory per
se, the Naval Weapons Center (NWC) encompasses the Naval
Air Facility, Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron Five,
and the associated missile test ranges. In its most basic
form NWC is a manpower reservoir of technical experts which
are continuously organized and reorganized to meet the needs
of the various missile projects. In fact, NWC has been com-
pared to a "model shop" where engineers have been pretty
much left alone to "do their own thing." The results have
been outstanding: SIDEWINDER, SHRIKE, and WALLEYE to
mention a few.
major defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum
practicable extent consistent with the urgency and impor-
tance of each program.
3) The development and production of a major defense system
shall be managed by a single individual (program manager)
who shall have a charter which provides sufficient author-
ity to accomplish recognized program objectives.
4) Layers of authority between the program manager and his
component head shall be minimal.
3Packard, David, Defense Industry Bulletin




The traditional project management relationships between
NWC and NAVAIR are illustrated in Exhibit (III-l) which
includes the organizational/command relationships as well as
the lines of communication. The project manager is chartered
by and reports directly to COMNAVAIR. He reports to the
Deputy Commander for Plans and Programs for administrative
purposes only. The project organization interfaces with the
functional divisions (Research and Technology, Material
Acquisition, Contracting and Logistics & Fleet Support)
through project coordination at the working level. The head
of each functional division designates a project support
officer as the coordinator of project requirements within
the division. There is direct communication between the
project management office and the field activity, but the
main channel for the conduct of normal project business is
through the project support officers. Normally the field
activity has or will evolve an organization providing counter-
parts for each coordinator within the field activity and as
primary points of contact for the conduct of project business.
The system commands and laboratories are linked at the
command level through the basic agreements and implementing
task orders.
When the system command has a need for in-house laboratory
services an agreement on the scope of the work contemplated,
similar to the contracts used with private industry, is
worked out through negotiations between the principals









































































and complicated than those required when contracting with
industry, and the cost in time, the technical manhours , and
the administrative steps in providing funds and program
direction are far simpler. The field activity incorporates
the proposed task into its Laboratory Program Summary and
this serves as a formal proposal to the system command
sponsor. The work proposed by the field activity may be
acceptable to the system command without change in which
case the only step necessary to implement the agreement is
to make funds available by issuing a project order. Any
necessary modifications to the work package are prepared by
the systems command in the form of a task assignment letter
called an airtask.
The concept of field development is not a new one. For
years it has been recommended, although infrequently used,
as a way to better utilize laboratory expertise while at the
same time making them more cost conscious. In addition, it
was felt that the laboratories could provide more accurate
cost estimates and in turn prove to be a good baseline with
which to compare industrial research and development costs.
While the technical prowess of the laboratories has never
been questioned, it has recently been argued that the system
commands have not been able to keep up with the technical
demands of modern complex weapon systems. Whatever the
reasons, the benefits of field development have been known
for quite some time and it seems that the DEPSECDEF Memoran-
dum of May 19 70 supported by the CNO Memorandum of February
16

1971 provided the needed impetus to initiate the field devel-
opment concept.
Presumably as a result of this guidance, the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development (ASM (R&D))
released a memorandum which set forth his decision to place
the management responsibility for the development of the
BENDER Missile at the Naval Weapons Center:
In consonance with the importance of this program, I
desire that the BENDER Weapon System design and develop-
ment through prototype test and evaluation be the direct
responsibility of the Naval Weapons Center, China Lake,
California. The longer term problem of pilot line and
production procurement should be accomplished jointly with
the appropriate CNM organization. In order to provide
early attention in the Engineering Design and Development
Phase to production and support requirements, the appro-
priate CNM personnel should be assigned to the NWC project
now. The NWC will seek technical assistance from other
Naval laboratories, the Office of Naval Material and
contractors when and as appropriate to the program needs.
The funds associated with the Design and Weapon System
Development Phase will be under the fiscal management and
control of the Naval Weapons Center
.
Some have claimed that the Secretary's memorandum was
purposely vague with respect to implementation procedures.
They contend that this flexibility was essential due to
the program's unusual structure and lack of precedence.
Whatever the reason, ill-defined jobs breed misunderstandings
and conflict. This fact was realized and an attempt to
avoid this and other potential problems resulted in a letter
of agreement between the Commander of NAVAIR and the Comman-
der of Weapons Center. Exhibit (III-2) shows the management
organization diagram specified by the agreement. A month
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It was in this environment that BENDER entered the
Advanced Development Phase. In accordance with the agree-
ment, a Development Manager was appointed at NWC and a
Project Coordinator was appointed at NAVAIR. Neither was
given a charter nor authority commensurate with that of a
project manager. Their only formal guidance was the
NAVAIR-NWC Agreement.
B. CASE PROBLEM
Dr. S. F. Williams was appointed to head the BENDER
Project at NWC mainly because of his background in the
missile development field. (One of his earlier projects had
been the RATTLER Missile.) In addition, he had much
experience in private industry which was deemed a special
asset in this case because BENDER was to eventually become
deeply involved with a weapon system integrating contractor.
Dr. Williams saw his first job as that of organizing the
BENDER Project at NWC. Since his only formal guidance was
the NAVAIR-NWC Agreement he began searching his early files
from the RATTLER Project for additional information. He soon
realized that BENDER was not going to be as simple as RATTLER,
While he was familiar with the field development concept and
of the Navy's decision to try it out on BENDER, he never
realized what it actually entailed.
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As Dr. Williams began listing all the functions he would
be responsible for he became a bit concerned. The agreement
delineated those functions that would be the responsibility
of the development manager at NWC and many were new to him.
As he went over the agreement he began thinking out some of
the functions and how he might be able to react.
1. System Definition No problem; just like we did
on RATTLER.
2. Financial Management I've sent data and simple
cost estimates to NAVAIR before, but this time the Project
does all required cost estimating; this means control of the
entire budget for BENDER rests with NWC.
3. Program Control Documentation I know that NAVAIR
writes the Technical Development Plan (TDP) and Performance
Specifications but all the real work for those documents is
done here at NWC. Now the Advance Procurement Plan (APP) is




4. Contracting Again no problem. I've worked with
the Naval Regional Procurement Office before and they're
professional
.
5TDP - The technical roadmap for the project. It docu-
ments those actions, procedures and resources necessary to
achieve the required capability and serves as a living record
of plans and decisions.
APP - The financial roadmap for the project. It covers
such issues as funding, methods of procurement, source com-
petence and source selection, contract type, competition,




5. Industry Participation Now you're talking my
language.
6. Data Acquisition This is another rough one
. . .
a proven prototype data package. At least this is in
my area.
7. Liaison I've worked with the Air Force before on
the RATTLER and this should be no different.
8. ILS Hmm ... a good engineering problem—any
engineer worth his salt automatically designs in reliability
and maintainability.
9. Reporting Just like always— I've got to keep
Washington informed.
After quite a bit of thought, Dr. Williams decided that
he would not be able to manage all these additional functions
and give the technical aspects of the missile development
the close attention it would need. After all, the BENDER
concept was pushing the "state of the art" and he could
already see that there would be numerous problems to be
solved. In addition "paper pushing" wasn't why he was hired.
The obvious solution was to find a staff assistant or manager
to handle these business/support related problems while he
got on with the important job of developing the missile.
Getting the right person was no easy task since the
engineers at NWC were hired for their technical expertise,
not managerial ability. On the recommendation of his depart-
ment head, Dr. Williams selected Joe Stern, a bright young
engineer who had worked at NWC for five years and had a
22

reputation as one who was good at "getting things done
through people." He assigned Joe as Management Programs and
Plans Branch Manager as shown in Exhibit (III-4) in order to
coordinate the management aspects of the project.
The next day Dr. Williams called Joe into his office and
began by explaining the BENDER Project and how it fit into
the Navy's plans for field development. Continuing he said,
Joe, here is a copy of an agreement worked out between ADM
Holbrook at NAVAIR and ADM Stuart here at NWC concerning
the operation of this project. Study it thoroughly. As
you will see I have been assigned many new business/support
functions which quite frankly I just don't have the time to
do. Your job as Programs and Plans Branch Manager will be
to 'coordinate these new management aspects of the project
as outlined in the agreement. If you have any questions my
door is always open. Good luck.
CAPT Bill Hoffman was assigned as the NAVAIR BENDER
Project Coordinator. His job was to represent NAVAIR in
matters dealing with NWC and also to represent the project
in Washington. With respect to the latter function he would
be interfacing with higher authority in the Navy, OSD, and
the Congress much like other program managers. In fact, it
was envisioned that he would eventually become the program
manager sometime prior to the transition to production.
Unfortunately, CAPT Hoffman was not at all happy with
his job as Project Coordinator, especially since he was not
assigned a working staff to assist him. In the first place,
the information demands on him as the sole representative
of a major project on the Washington scene were overwhelming.
Frequently quick reaction answers were required by higher




























































consultation with the project personnel at NWC . For example,
BENDER was carrying on a rather extensive parallel develop-
ment program in the seeker area. When the budget people
wanted to know the effect of a certain dollar cut, CAPT Hoff-
man could not immediately reply because a decision of this
magnitude depended upon which seeker development was to be
terminated - a decision obviously to be made at NWC. To
make matters worse, the project was not always keeping him
"up to speed" with respect to project developments. In
addition to this a normal project support officer organiza-
tion had not developed in NAVAIR because during the period
of advance development management responsibility was vested
in NWC. NAVAIR personnel who needed information on BENDER
soon realized that there was a communication problem and
began to contact NWC directly and to rely less on CAPT
Hoffman.
More than once CAPT Hoffman attempted to use authority
which he did not have to force a solution to these problems.
He reasoned that since the letter of agreement said, "the
Development Manager . . . will be responsive to the NAVAIR
BENDER Project Coordinator ..." the Project Coordinator
should have some authority over the Development Manager.
In addition, he felt that since the Project Coordinator would
eventually become the project manager and be responsible for
the results of decisions currently being made, he should have
some voice in making them.
25

Dr. Williams 1 position was simple. He was responsible
for the development of BENDER and therefore he was going to
"call the shots." However, CAPT Hoffman was not his only
problem. Program documentation was late to nonexistent -
the TDP and APP were not yet completed. A clear financial
picture of the project was rarely available and Washington
was constantly asking "What if" and "Howgozit" questions
which Dr. Williams could not satisfactorily answer in the
short time frames available.
Another aspect of the problem was developing in the
minds of the Navy officials in Washington. It seemed to
them that many decisions were made in light of technical
evaluations without proper consideration for management
implications. For example, a test program was laid out which
ended with the first air-launched missile to be fired in
April. After discussions with DDR&E personnel this schedule
was compressed by a month so that the test results would be
available for the budget justification hearings in March.
Another problem was that the unit production cost of BENDER
was exceeding DCP threshold. However, if the production run
was large enough to include Air Force requirements this cost
could be substantially reduced. In short, Navy, Air Force,
and OSD officials did not have a common understanding of the
total market potential for BENDER.
In response to these problems Dr. Williams began
relying more and more on Joe Stern for the solutions. Fre-
quently the answers he got were inadequate and as a result
26

Dr. Williams found himself getting more involved in the
management aspects of BENDER. The basic problem centered
around the fact that BENDER had been in Advanced Development
for a year, spent more than twenty million dollars, and in
the eyes of the Washington officials had little to show for
it. It is not surprising then that Dr. Williams was feeling
increasing pressure from these officials to get the program
on the right track. Numerous briefings, which centered on
the management vice technical aspects of the program, were
scheduled in order to get a clearer picture of the situation.
To make things even worse, BENDER fell prey to numerous
budget cuts - some quite severe. This resulted in a general
program stretchout of more than a year with DSARC II slipping
more than six months.
It was at this point ADM Stuart decided that he and
Dr. Hacker, the Technical Director at NWC , had better meet
with Dr. Williams.
C. CASE DISCUSSION
1. Discuss the problems facing Dr. Williams. What
recommendations would you make?
2. Evaluate the BENDER situation in terms of top man-
agement desires (SECDEF, SECNAV, and CNO) , DOD Directive
5000.1, and the principles of good management. What recom-
mentations would you make?
27

IV. THE BENDER MISSILE: A MANAGEMENT REVIFW CASE STUDY
A. CASE BACKGROUND
There are two primary control devices used by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in the management of
weapon system programs. They are the Defense Systems Acqui-
sition Review Council (DSARC) and the Management Review.
The purpose of these two devices is to facilitate control
that is exercised by those who have approval/disapproval
authority over a program and as such must be kept informed
on technical progress and managerial plans. This usually
means top management. But who is top management? Within
the Navy the term usually is reserved for the Chief of
Naval Operations or the Secretary of the Navy. At the
Department of Defense (DOD) level top management usually
refers to SECDEF or DEPSECDEF. It is not reasonable to
expect these few top managers to be adequately informed on
all aspects of each program in order to make informed deci-
sions when they are necessary. Then how are these top
managers able to control all of these various programs?
Essentially they delegate the duty of keeping track of
programs and making minor decisions to Assistant Secretaries
of Defense or the Directors of the Departments. The Assis-
tant Secretaries and Directors are all assisted by working
staffs, Each Assistant Secretary or Director is responsible
for monitoring the progress of each program that is within
28

his area of cognizance. The area of cognizance is determined
by which phase of a program's life cycle the department is
concerned. For example, the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering (DDR&E) and his staff are responsible for those
programs undergoing Exploratory Development, Advanced
Development, and Engineering Development.
There are many techniques for controlling a program. But
what is the purpose of control? At the OSD level it is to
insure that the right balances are achieved between offensive
and defensive weapons, that a proper technology base is
present within the United States, that we maintain the right
amount of Research and Development capability, plus numerous
other responsibilities all of which must be accomplished within
the limited available budget. It is this limited budget that
necessitates much control, and the money is the means by
which control is exercised. That is, control is exercised
by granting or revoking funds for a program. The best ideas
in the world are useless unless there are funds to develop
these ideas.
The primary technique of control at the OSD level is
through the DCP/DSARC process. The DCP is a summary document
prepared by the DOD Component in close coordination with
DDR&E and other cognizant OSD Offices. The original DCP is
prepared prior to the Program Initiation DSARC and is used
to condense and summarize the program objectives, plans, and
parameters for the development effort. It contains milestones
and thresholds on cost, performance, and schedule. The DCP
29

is signed by the Service after the recommendations of the
DSARC are added and then forwarded to SECDEF . Once SECDEF
signs the DCP it becomes the instrument by which his deci-
sion is implemented. That is, the DCP becomes a contract
between OSD and the Service and as a contract requires the
Service and its program to live within the DCP boundaries.
For example, if the program should be in danger of exceeding
its cost threshold then it is obligated to notify OSD so that
the threshold may be changed or some actions to reduce cost
may be made. Changes to the DCP are normally made as a
result of issues brought up at later DSARCs. These changes
usually take the form of a Decision Memorandum, prepared by
the Service in close coordination with DDR&E, that conveys
to SECDEF the recommendation to allow the program to continue
with the acquisition process.
The DSARC is the principal means by which OSD gathers
information in order that SECDEF may make a decision on the
future of a program. A DSARC is held at three distinct
points during the life cycle of a program: prior to program
initiation (DSARC I)
,
prior to the program entering Engineer-
ing Development (DSARC II) , and prior to the program commenc-
ing Full Scale Production (DSARC III) . Occasionally a DSARC
is held just prior to a program commencing Advanced Develop-
ment (DSARC IA) . This occasional DSARC is used when some-
thing unusual happens during Exploratory Development and
requires OSD to look into it prior to Advanced Development.
Common practice is to think of the DSARC as a decision-making
30

board. This is not necessarily so, the DSARC is merely a
prelude to a major program decision made by top management.
The four members of a DSARC review all aspects of the pro-
gram and make a recommendation to the SECDEF . The SECDEF,
or DEPSECDEF if designated, then decides if the program will
be allowed to continue with the acquisition process, to do
some more work in specific areas before it receives full
approval for proceeding, or to be dropped entirely.
In many cases SECDEF or DEPSECDEF are unable to actively
administer the proper amount of control over a program that
is desired from an OSD point of view. This is especially
true of the programs that are in between major decision points
such as DSARCs. For programs in these phases top management
usually delegates authority for control of the program to its
staff, in this case elements of OSD. The Management Review
is the primary means that OSD, particularly DDR&E, uses to
exercise control of the program between DSARCs. Ideally,
the average program will only have one Management Review
during its life cycle; that usually being held within three
to five months after the beginning of Engineering Develop-
ment. This time is usually selected because it allows OSD
to look at how initial stages of Engineering Development are
The four members of a DSARC are the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Installations and Logistics) , the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Comptroller) , and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Systems Analysis) . Occasionally the DEPSECDEF will attend
and take an active part as a fifth member of the Council.
DDR&E acts as Chairman for DSARC I and DSARC II. ASD(ISL)
is Chairman for DSARC III.
31

progressing. If they are not satisfied v/ith the progress
being made or the plans being used they are able to make
changes that will have a positive effect on the program
before DSARC III. Also it allows OSD to insure that the
directives of top management are being complied with.
The attendees at a Management Review vary somewhat with
the importance of the program and the interest within a
specific department. DDR&E is specifically responsible for
deciding when the review is to be held and conducting it.
Notice for a review is accomplished by a memorandum from
DDR&E to the Service Secretary for Research and Development.
Once the memorandum reaches the Assistant Secretary it is
passed down the chain-of-command until it reaches the desig-
2
nated program. Exhibit (IV-1) is the format guide for the
actual memorandum. The primary concern of this review is
with various management issues; however, in the specific
questions section of the review format there are usually
questions dealing with areas of technical concern to the
review board. The' preparation for a Management Review within
OSD and the Services is quite extensive. This is evident
from Exhibit (IV-2) which gives an idea of some of the pre-
briefings held just within OSD.
In terms of topics discussed and the material contained
in the presentation there is little difference between a
2Within the Navy the memorandum would normally go to the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research and Develop-





DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Washington, D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE (SERVICE) (R&D)
SUBJECT: Review of the Management of the (system)
Reference: ODDR&E Memo to Assistant Secretaries A/N/AF(R&D),
ASD(I&L), ASD(C), Subject: Management Reviews of
Major Weapon Systems — Revised Schedule.
This memorandum is intended to provide guidance on the review
of the management of (system) scheduled by reference on
(date)
,
1600, in Conference Area 1F801, Room #7.
Enclosure 1 is an outline which generally describes the form
and content of the management review briefing. Those specific
topics unique to the management of this system should be
incorporated. Enclosure 2 is a list of specific topics con-
sidered relevant to this review.* You may add others which
in your judgment are also important.
Since this briefing will be classified, it is requested that
the names and security clearance of personnel planning to





Enclosure 2 is not contained in this exhibit because it
does not have a standardized format. The format depends upon






MANAGEMENT REVIFW OF THE SYSTEM




Outline Scope of Program
-Objectives
-Size and complexity
-Peculiar management needs (e.g. International
aspects, Joint-Service Program)
II. Project Manager's Office (PMO) and Supporting Organizations
Describe the PMO. Typical information includes:
The number of personnel in the PMO (break-
down by the most important functional areas).
The tenure of the Project Manager (PM) and
his key personnel. Summarize rank and
experience of the PMO personnel.
Build-up and phase-out of PMO staffing.
Identification of the important supporting
organizations (including non-Government)
,
their functions, authorities, responsibilities
and overall support provided, e.g.:
Technical/Engineering









III . Authority, Responsibility and Control — Organizational
Relationships
Describe the relationships between participating
organizations, their authorities, responsibilities,
means of management and control, e.g.:
Reporting relationships, e.g., to whom
does PM report, how often, how directly.
Why report at this level? Describe com-
munications with top management. How
many people between PM and Service
Secretary on decisions?
Describe PM authority and control over
support organizations identified in II.
Describe PM authority and control over the
development and procurement of required
GFE.
Describe approval authority that is exer-
cised over the following, by whom, how
this is documented, and built-in safeguards
to prevent excessive optimism :







Schedule estimates and changes
Describe major limitations on the PMO '
s
authority and the thresholds for his authority.




IV. Management Planning , Systems and Control
Provide sufficient information to permit evaluation
of the adequacy of management planning, systems
and control. Typical information includes:
Major Plans (Advanced Procurement Plan,
Integrated Logistics Support Plan, etc.). Who
assures that they are followed, are current
and are revised when necessary?
Formal reviews (both of contracts and of program
by PM and higher authority, e.g., design review,
reliability review, critical problem review,
etc.). Timing? Who is responsible?
— The various baselines (configuration, unit
production cost, total cost, schedule, and
operational performance) . How are they
established and maintained? How are predictions
made?
The configuration management system, including
the criteria for proposed changes, who does
the evaluation and who makes final decisions?
Data and Management Systems
Principal management systems used, parti-
cularly for progress measurement, prediction,
problem identification and control. Are they
used by the PM? What documentation do we get?
How much does it cost? Identify OSD or Service
required management systems which the PM feels
are not needed?
The key reports that are used to track cost,
schedule and technical performance. How does
the PM relate the work progress to the cost of
work? Identify OSD or Service required reports
which the PM feels are unnecessary ?
Contract Data Requirements - efforts to keep
these to the minimum necessary and to assure
proper timing of data ordering or delivery -






Describe formal risk analysis conducted and
identify the principal program and technical
risks. How is program schedule tailored to
the identified risks?
Hov.7 much verification (hardware fabrication and
test) is planned for the risk areas. How are
these linked to the overall schedules, e.g.,
what releases are predicated on successful tests.
Show graph of schedule vs. risks and commitments.
What steps are being taken (e.g., back-up pro-
grams) to minimize program losses in the event
of failure in areas of concern.
Describe any trade-offs made in performance,
cost or schedule to avoid or alleviate specific
risks
.
Explain schedule and rationale for any concurring
of development and production.
How much confidence is there in achieving the
technical, operational, cost and schedule goals.
Give your estimate of quantities for key opera-
tional and technical parameters, total costs,
unit production cost, IOC date, etc. that will
most likely be achieved?
Summarize DCP thresholds with current estimates
and relate identified risks.
At what threshold in performance and cost and
schedule is this not worth going ahead on.
VI . Test and Evaluation
Outline the overall program of test and evalua-
tion, with emphasis on test management.
What problems have been encountered in keeping
the test program on schedule? Has the test





Have test facilities been programmed ahead
to meet the needs of this weapon system or
equipment?
Is testing being conducted in a completely
objective environment? To what extent has
operational realism been incorporated into
the test program from the outset?
Does the project manager or SPO have access
to all test results, including contractor tests?
At what points in the development cycle are
test results formally introduced into key
program decisions? Looking ahead to the next
milestone, what risks does the program face
as evidenced by the testing accomplished to
date?
Is the total test plan integrated, i.e.,
combines, where possible, specific tests to
eliminate duplicate testing and make efficient
use of facilities.
VIII . Funding/Cost Analysis
Summarize funding profile (by fiscal year)
showing the current approved program and
the current estimate for both development
and production.
Describe independent cost analysis efforts
made to validate contractor/bidder estimates
and to develop funding profile.
Describe the process by which cost estimates
are revised. Which contractor reports provide
the basis for revision of cost estimates? How
frequently is the total system estimate revised?
If the program has CSCSC, describe how the data
on the Cost Performance Report are utilized.
How much of budget is "held back" to fund the




EXHIBIT (IV-1 ) (Continued)
VIII. Procurement
Describe the procurement plans throughout the life
cycle starting with Concept Formulation. For
example
:
The contracts that are planned, the kinds of
contracts to be used and competition planned.
How the Government commitment and risk is
minimized. How the contractor risk will be
kept within reasonable limits.
Plan for assessing development progress and
technical milestone achievement. Plan for
deciding on specific procurement actions
and contract options as a function of
development progress and milestone achieve-
ment to reduce risks and overcommitment.
Production options, and the rationale for
their selection and the conditions under
which they can be exercised.
Safeguards (contractual and in-house) that
exist to minimize changes and their impact.
What opportunities does the contractor have
to "get well" under this or follow-on
contracts?
IX. Examples of Specific Problems
Provide several specific examples of problems that




DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
Washington, D.C. 20301




SUBJECT: Management Reviews of Major Weapon Systems
Reference: (a) DEPSECDEF Memo, Management of New Weapon Systems,
The management reviews of new weapon systems that the Deputy
Secretary of Defense requested me to make in Reference (a) have
started. Based upon the first full-scale review on MALLARD, it
appears that the following kinds of actions are required for
each briefing:
1. About one month prior to the briefing: The Deputy
Director (A,E&M) should prepare a DDR&E memo to the
Service providing guidance on the briefing (similar
to memoranda issued on AWACS, SANGUINE, MALLARD AND
SAM-D)
.
2. Just prior to the briefing: The Deputy responsible for
the program should discuss with me the important
management issues, questions to ask, etc. to prepare
me for the briefing. Also provide a folder with
pertinent material for my use during the briefing.
3. Immediately after the briefing: The Deputy responsible
for the system needs to prepare a memorandum to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense giving results of the
review (evaluation of the management and management
plans) and what actions, if any, need to be taken.
4. Within two weeks after the briefing: The Deputy
responsible for the system will prepare a memorandum
to the Service directing actions required as a
result of the Management Review.
In addition, as a result of the series of briefings, some
DOD-wide actions on management of major systems may be required.
It is important for everyone to recognize that the briefings
by the Services are just one part of the reviews for each
system. The most important part is the OSD evaluation based
on the briefing and determination of the actions that need to




Management Review and a DSARC. The significant difference
is in the outputs of the two reviews. The Management Review
does not lead to an updating of the DCP contract, and is
therefore not a major decision forum. Consequently the
principal members of a DSARC may or may not attend a Manage-
ment Review depending upon the importance of the program
undergoing the review and their specific interest in the
program.
B. CASE PROBLEM
The BENDER Missile Program was never subjected to a
formal DSARC I. The need for this DSARC was eliminated by
the DEPSECDEF approval of the DCP that resulted from the Air
Force-Navy recommendations on air-to-air missiles. Although
there was not a formal DSARC .it is reasonable to assume that
OSD took an active part in the preparation of the recommen-
dations and the resulting DCP and was therefore well informed
about the status of the missile's development at this time.
However, there were considerably strong feelings within the
working staff in OSD that the lack of a formal DSARC I would
almost certainly result in a DSARC IA before BENDER would be
allowed to begin Advanced Development.
Slightly less than two years after the DCP was signed a
meeting was held in the office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering. Attending this meeting were six
people, the Development Manager of BENDER, the Assistant
Technical Director for the Naval Weapons Center, ASN(R&D),
DDR&E, ASD(ISL), and DEPSECDEF. This meeting yielded a
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decision to proceed into Advanced Development and approved
a few minor revisions to the DCP. Since the revisions were
minor the Decision Memorandum was prepared by the BENDFR
Program staff. When the memorandum was finished it was
forwarded to DFPSECDEF who signed it.
The revised DCP still specified that the BENDER Missile
should have a firing envelope somewhat greater than the
improved RATTLER. It specified that the unit production cost
be about the same as the improved RATTLER. It also allowed
approximately two years for Advanced Development and set a
threshold of $9 2M and a target of $77M through DSARC II.
Although the new DCP was approved at the meeting, DDR&F
expressed some concern about the conduct of the BENDER
development and imposed a requirement for quarterly reports
on the general status of the program and certain key develop-
ment issues. The concern expressed by DDR&E was apparently
not so much caused by the way the program was being run, but
by the approach of giving NWC managerial authority over the
development. This- concern was primarily a reaction over
public clamor about poor management of defense programs and
in view of the fact that NWC was primarily technically
oriented in its management philosophy.
Even at the beginning of Advanced Development some sig-
nificant problems existed. Probably the most significant was
the distance between NWC and Washington. This problem was
further complicated by the Letter-of-Agreement between the
Commander of NWC and the Commander of NAVAIR. To even
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further complicate this picture the program received a sub-
stantial funds reduction just a few months after Advanced
Development had begun. As a result of this Dr. Sam Williams,
the Development Manager for BENDER, made a conscious decision
to reduce the number of flight tests to be performed in
favor of a more extensive and less expensive ground test
program. Further, he was forced to substantially reduce the
development effort being done on the Dynamic BENDER. He was
also forced to pick the most promising seeker and guidance
approach at this time and stop development of all other
versions
.
A short time before the actual funds reduction several
events occurred that resulted in a difference of opinion as
to what caused the reduction. First, NAVAIR requested that
the level of effort on the Dynamic BENDER be substantially
reduced. Dr. Williams, backed by NWC , refused. Shortly
thereafter a request from NAVAIR to the program asked the
program to specify what the impact of a funding reduction of
40% would be. Some personnel within the BENDER Program felt
that the resulting funds reduction was due to the refusal by
NWC to reduce the level of effort on the Dynamic BENDER.
NAVAIR countered with the argument that the funds were reduced
because the program was unable to adequately answer how the
3funds reduction would affect it. A third point of view
3At the time of the funding reduction the BENDFP Missile
Program did not have a Management Information System capable
of handling this type of question. This was finally cor-
rected shortly before the Management Review and the program
can now adequately respond to these questions.
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existed and was held by many at NWC and NAVAIR although it
remains relatively unspoken. Many felt that the Navy needed
money for another program and directed NAVAIR to reduce the
funding of one of its programs. Since the money for BFNDFR
was in-house and no outside contractor was involved and there
was no contract that would have to be terminated or stretched
out BENDER presented the easiest source for these funds.
To add to the woes of Dr. Williams, other problems were
beginning to arise. Technically, the development of the
seeker was slipping slightly behind schedule due to some
unanticipated development problems. In addition, the weight
of the missile was too high according to the Air Force and
would severely limit their ability to load and use the
missile at advanced bases. Financially, the unit production
cost estimates were running somewhat higher than those speci-
fied by the DCP. And to top it all off he had just received
a memorandum from NAVAIR that said that DDR&F would like to
hold a Management Review in approximately a month. NAVAIR
also stated that separate pre-briefings would be required to
NAVAIR, NAVMAT, OPNAV , and the Secretary of the Navy.
With the actual presentation to OSD about a month away
and the required pre-brief s even closer, Dr. Williams realized
that the preparation of the presentation must receive his
primary interest. He could see that his lack of experience
in preparing for a major review of this type would be a big
handicap. Fortunately he did have a retired military officer,
Mr. George Lee, with Washington duty experience in the
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procurement field, whom he had just appointed as the head of
his Management Programs and Plans Branch. After consulta-
tion with Mr. Lee it became evident to Dr. Williams that he
had an even more difficult job to do in getting ready for
the presentation than originally imagined. The BENDER
Program did not have direct access to the functional people
in NAVAIR who in a normal program would have been the ones
intimately acquainted with the program and, from experience
could have picked out just the right points that would have
enabled him to effectively brief higher authority. Mr. Lee
also pointed out that along with limited support from NAVAIR
they would also have only limited contact with OSD because
of their great distance from Washington. He pointed out
that it would be necessary to make use of any and al]
"friends of the program" available in Washington to find out
if there were any hidden issues that were not brought out in
the briefing guide received from OSD. Mr. Lee suggested
that maybe the most appropriate place to begin the prepara-
tion was to look at any reports and briefings given to
Washington personnel because this would almost certainly be
the only hard facts known about the program in Washington.
Since the final briefing would be held in OSD and the
pre-briefings would have to be held up the chain-of-command
,
Dr. Williams saw this as a possible way of getting some of
the reduced funds restored, provided he used the proper
approach. He realized that the proper approach was further
complicated by the necessity of presenting a Navy position
once he went to OSD. This meant that he would have to sell
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all those who would get pre-briefs within the Navy on the
need for more funds. Dr. Williams also looked at some of
the decisions he had made when the funds were reduced to
determine their impact upon his ability to meet the DSARC II
4
milestones and satisfy the requirements of policy directives
Major events and their relative time relationships that
Dr. Williams and Mr. Lee had to consider are contained in
Exhibit (IV-3). With these points and more in mind, Dr.
Williams called his branch heads together and assigned them
the particular points from the briefing guide that were in
their areas of cognizance. The branch heads were to supply
information on these areas to Mr. Lee who would be respon-
sible for putting the presentation together.
C. CASE DISCUSSION
1. In light of DOD Directive 5000.1 what impact will
the major decisions, particularly those relating to the
funding reduction, have on preparation for the Management
Review?
2. What are some of the major points that must be con-
sidered by the project staff in preparing for the Management
Review?
D. CASE PROBLEM (Part Two)
The Management Review was held on schedule. The pre-
briefs resulted in the final presentation being divided into
4
The program had already received an extension of six
months in DSARC II due to overall program stretchout because
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two parts, a management section and a technical section.
The management section was given by CAPT Hoffman, the NAVAIR
Project Coordinator, and the technical section was given by
Dr. Williams. The Management Review was well attended with
representatives from ASD (I&L) , ASD(COMPT), ASD(SA), and
DDR&E(T&F) plus DDR&E. Attending from the Navy were the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Material,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, representatives from OP-098
and OP-05, and the Acting Technical Director of NWC . The
Air Force also had several representatives present at the
Review.
Exhibit (IV-4) is an abridged version of the actual
memorandum that resulted from the Management Review presen-
tation. The only part removed were those references to
specific dates and references to specifics of the missile
development program that would have made the memorandum
classified.
E. CASE DISCUSSION (Part Two)
1. Would you interpret this memorandum to indicate the
end of the field development concept?
2. What do you think the impact of this memorandum will




THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THF AIR FORCE
SUBJECT: BENDER Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile; Request for
Action Concerning
I have been advised of the findings of the DSARC members
who met a month ago to review the BENDFR management and pro-
gram status. I want to reaffirm the position that, in the
future, we will only develop and acquire one short-range and
one medium-range air-to-air missile type for joint-service
and multiple-aircraft use. While it is important that' a full
range of alternatives be explored prior to a decision to
approve the BENDFR for engineering development, there is no
intention to develop or procure more than one short-range
missile and one medium-range missile type.
The following actions are requested:
1. That the Navy and Air Force work together to evaluate
alternative approaches to meeting the needs for a
next-generation short-range air-to-air missile (SRAAM)
Specifically:
a. Differences should be resolved regarding short-
range air-to-air missile performance requirements,
especially as concerns missile off-boresight
capability and launch weight, and a Joint Specific
Operational Requirement should be prepared for the
next-generation SRAAM. The JSOR should be coor-
dinated and approved within four months to enable
the evolving BENDER design to be responsive to the
JSOR.
b. The Air Force should provide full-time representa-
tation on the NWC BFNDER development team and in
the Office of the NAVAIR BENDFR Project Coordi-
nator as soon as possible.
c. The Navy, as executive Service for BENDER develop-
ment, should take immediate steps to establish a
single focal point within the Naval Air Systems





responsibility and accountability for BFNDFR
development and acquisition. This office should
be created and staffed within six months and
should include a Deputy Program Manager for Air
Force applications. The Navy has forwarded a
proposed Memorandum of Understanding to the Air
Force and is understood to be ready to fund all
BENDER RDT&E except Air Force peculiar items
(e.g. Air Force test missiles and peculiar
support) . The Navy and Air Force should complete
action on this Memorandum of Understanding as soon
as possible.
d. The Navy should increase the level of effort on
alternatives other than the "baseline" design to
the extent that viable alternatives exist for the
DSARC to review, coupled with a reasonable level
of test data to support their expected performance
In addition to the four versions presently being
studied, an austere version should be investigated
e. The results of Navy/Air Force trade-off analyses
of the five potential BFNDFR designs should be
provided to OSD for review at least six months
prior to DSARC II. However, I do not view the
planned DSARC II date to be constraining. If it
takes a few extra weeks to do a satisfactory job
of analyzing the alternatives and defining the
right program, this extra time is a good invest-
ment.
2. The Navy should continue effort on both the "baseline"
seeker and alternatives which offer superior counter-
counter measures, with a view toward fully developing
and testing both.
3. Please work with the ODDR&E Deputy Director (Test and
Evaluation) to define a satisfactory T&E plan.





DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
SUBJECT: Acquisition of Major Defense Systems
I. PURPOSE
This Directive establishes policy for major defense
system acquisition in the Military Departments and
Defense Agencies (referred to as DoD Components)
.
II. APPLICATION
This Directive applies to major programs, so designated
by the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense
(referred to as SecDef ) . This designation shall consider
(1) dollar value (programs which have an estimated RDT&F
cost in excess of 50 million dollars, or an estimated
Production cost in excess of 200 million dollars); (2)
national urgency; (3) recommendations by DoD Component
Heads or Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) officials.
In addition, the management principles in this Directive
are applicable to all programs.
III. POLICY
A. Mode of Operation - Successful development, production
and deployment of major defense systems are primarily
dependent upon competent people, rational priorities
and clearly defined responsibilities. Responsibility
and authority for the acquisition of major defense
systems shall be decentralized to the maximum practi-
cable extent consistent with the urgency and impor-
tance of each program. The development and production
of a major defense system shall be managed by a single
individual (program manager) who shall have a charter
which provides sufficient authority to accomplish
recognized program objectives. Layers of authority
between the program manager and his Component Head
shall be minimum. For programs involving two or more
Components, the Component having dominant interest
shall designate the program manager, and his charter
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shall be approved by the cognizant official within
OSD. The assignment and tenure of program managers
shall be a matter of concern to DoD Component Heads
and shall reflect career incentives designed to
attract, retain and reward competent personnel.
1. The DoD Components are responsible for identify-
ing needs and defining, developing and producing
systems to satisfy those needs. Component Heads
are also responsible for contractor source selec-
tion unless otherwise specified by the SecDef on
a specific program.
2. The OSD is responsible for (a) establishing acqui-
sition policy, (b) assuring that major defense
system programs are pursued in response to valid
needs and (c) evaluating policy implementation on
each approved program.
3. The OSD and DoD Components are responsible for
program monitoring, but will place minimum demands
for formal reporting on the program manager. Non-
recurring needs for information will be kept to
a minimum and handled informally.
4. The SecDef will make the decisions which initiate
program commitments or increase those commitments.
He may redirect a program because of an actual or
threatened breach of a program threshold stated
in an approved Development Concept Paper (DCP)
.
The DCP and the Defense System Acquisition Review
Council (DSARC) will support the SecDef decision-
making. These decisions will be reflected in the
next submission of the Program Objective Memoran-
dum (POM) by the DoD Component.
B. Conduct of Program - Because every program is different,
successful program conduct requires that sound judgment
be applied in using the management principles of this
Directive. Underlying specific defense system develop-
ments is the need for a strong and usable technology
base. This base will be maintained by conducting
research and advanced technology effort independent
of specific defense systems development. Advanced
technology effort includes prototyping, preferably
using small, efficient design teams and a minimum
amount of documentation. The objective is to obtain
significant advances in technology at minimum cost.
1. Program Initiation
a. Early conceptual effort is normally conducted
at the discretion of the DoD Component until
such time as the DoD Component determines that
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a major defense system program should be
pursued. It is crucial that the right deci-
sions be made during this conceptual effort;
wrong decisions create problems not easily
overcome later in the program. Therefore,
each DoD Component will designate a single
individual, such as the Assistant Secretary
for R&D, to be responsible for conceptual
efforts on new major programs.
b. The considerations which support the determin-
ation of the need for a system program,
together with a plan for that program, will
be documented in the DCP. The DCP will define
program issues, including special logistics
problems, program objectives, program plans,
performance parameters, areas of major risk,
system alternatives and acquisition strategy.
The DCP will be prepared by the DoD Component,
following an agreement between OSD and that
Component on a DCP outline. The Director,
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&F) (or
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecom-
munications) for his programs) has the basic
responsibility for coordination of inputs for
the DCP and its submittal to the DSARC for
consideration and to the SecDef for subsequent
decision. If approved, the program will be
conducted within the DCP thresholds.
Full-Scale Development. When the DoD Component is
sufficiently confident that program worth and
readiness warrant commitment of resources to full-
scale development, it will request a SecDef deci-
sion to proceed. At that time, the DSARC will
normally review program progress and suitability
to enter this phase and will forward its recommen-
dations to the SecDef for final decision. Such
review will confirm (a) the need for the selected
defense system in consideration of threat, system
alternatives, special logistics needs, estimates
of development costs, preliminary estimates of
life cycle costs and potential benefits in context
with overall DoD strategy and fiscal guidance;
(b) that development risks have been identified
and solutions are in hand; and (c) realism of the
plan for full-scale development.
Production/Deployment. When the DoD Component is
sufficiently confident that engineering is complete
and that commitment of substantial resources to
production and deployment is warranted, it will
request a SecDef decision to proceed. At that time,
the DSARC will again review program progress aid
suitability to enter substantial production/deploy-
ment and forward its recommendations to the SecDef
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for final decision. Such review will confirm
(a) the need for producing the defense system in
consideration of threat, estimated acquisition
and ownership costs and potential benefits in
context with overall DoD strategy and fiscal
guidance; (b) a practical engineering design,
with adequate consideration of production and
logistics problems is complete; (c) that all
previously identified technical uncertainties
have been resolved and that operational suit-
ability has been determined by test and evalua-
tion; and (d) the realism of the plan for the
remainder of the program. Some production fund-
ing for long lead material or effort may be
required prior to the production decision. In
such cases, the SecDef will decide whether a
DSARC review and revised DCP are required. In
any event, full production go-ahead will be
authorized by approval of the DCP.
C . Program Considerations
1. System need shall be clearly stated in operational
terms, with appropriate limits, and shall be
challenged throughout the acquisition process.
Statements of need/performance requirements shall
be matched where possible with existing technology.
Wherever feasible, operational needs shall be
satisfied through use of existing military or
commercial hardware. When need can be satisfied
only through new development, the equivalent needs
of the other DoD Components shall be considered to
guard against unnecessary proliferation.
2. Cost parameters shall be established which consi-
der the cost of acquisition and ownership;
discrete cost elements (e.g., unit production cost,
operating and support cost) shall be translated
into "design to" requirements. System development
shall be continuously evaluated against these
requirements with the same rigor as that applied
to technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs
shall be made between system capability, cost and
schedule. Traceability of estimates and costing
factors, including those for economic escalation,
shall be maintained.
3. Logistic support shall also be considered as a
principal design parameter with the magnitude,
scope and level of this effort in keeping with the
program phase. Early development effort will
consider only those parameters that are truly
necessary to basic defense system design, e.g.,
those logistic problems that have significant
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impact on system readiness, capability or cost.
Premature introduction of detailed operational
support considerations is to be avoided.
Programs shall be structured and resources allo-
cated to ensure that the demonstration of actual
achievement of program objectives is the pacing
function. Meaningful relationships between need,
urgency, risk and worth shall be thereby estab-
lished. Schedules shall be subject to trade-off
as much as any other program constraint. Schedules
and funding profiles shall be structured to accom-
modate unforeseen problems and permit task accom-
plishment without unnecessary overlapping or
concurrency.
Technical uncertainty shall be continually
assessed. Progressive cpmmitments of resources
which incur program risk will be made only when
confidence in program outcome is sufficiently
high to warrant going ahead. Models, mock-ups
and system hardware will be used to the greatest
possible extent to increase confidence level.
Test and evaluation shall commence as early as
possible. A determination of operational suit-
ability, including logistic support requirements,
will be made prior to large-scale production
commitments, making use of the most realistic
test environment possible and the best represen-
tation of the future operational system available.
The results of this operational testing will be
evaluated and presented to the DSARC at the time
of the production decision.
Contract type shall be consistent with all program
characteristics including risk. It is not possible
to determine the precise production cost of a new
complex defense system before it is developed;
therefore, such systems will not be procured using
the total package procurement concept or produc-
tion options that are contractually priced in the
development contract. Cost type prime and sub-
contracts are preferred where substantial develop-
ment effort is involved. Letter contracts shall
be minimized. When risk is reduced to the extent
that realistic pricing can occur, fixed-price type
contracts should be issued. Changes shall be
limited to those that are necessary or offer sig-
nificant benefit to the DoD. Where change orders
are necessary, they shall be contractually priced
or subject to an established ceiling before





8. The source selection decision shall take into
account the contractor's capability to develop
a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-
effective basis. The DoD Component shall have
the option of deciding whether or not the contract
will be completely negotiated before a program
decision is made. Solicitation documents shall
require contractor identification of uncertain-
ties and specific proposals for their resolution.
Solicitation and evaluation of proposals should
be planned to minimize contractor expense. Pro-
posals for cost-type or incentive contracts may
be penalized during evaluation to the degree that
the proposed cost is unrealistically low.
9. Management information/program control require-
ments shall provide information which is essential
to effective management control. Such information
should be generated from data actually utilized by
contractor operating personnel and provided in
summarized form for successively higher level
management and monitoring requirements. A single,
realistic work breakdown structure (WBS) shall be
developed for each program to provide a consistent
framework for (a) planning and assignment of
responsibilities, (b) control and reporting of
progress, and (c) establishing a data base for
estimating the future cost of defense systems.
Contractor management information/program control
systems, and reports emanating therefrom, shall
be utilized to the maximum extent practicable.
Government imposed changes to contractor systems
shall consist of only those necessary to satisfy
established DoD-wide standards. Documentation
shall be generated in the minimum amount to
satisfy necessary and specific management needs.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
1. Each DoD Component will implement this Directive within
90 days and forward two (2) copies of each implementing
document to the SecDef.
2. The number of implementing documents will be minimized
and necessary procedural guidance consolidated to the
greatest extent possible. Selected subjects to be
covered by DoD Directives/Instructions or joint
Service/Agency documents in support of this Directive
are listed in Enclosure 1. Each DoD Component will
forward the joint Service/Agency documents for which








DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Naval Air Systems Command
Washington, D.C. 20360
NAVAIR NOTICE
From: Commander, Naval Air Systems Command
Subj : BENDER Weapon System Development Project; special
management disciplines pertaining to
Ref: (a) ASN(RSD) conf Memorandum for Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and Chief of Naval Material
Encl: (1) COMNAVAIR - COMNAVWPNSCEN Agreement concerning the
Advanced Development and Prototype Test and Evalu-
ation Programs for BENDER Guided Weapon System
(2) NAVAIR - NAVWPNSCEN Management of BENDER Guided
Weapon System Development Program.
1. Purpose . The purpose of this notice is to:
a. Implement reference (a)
b. Distribute enclosure (1)
c. Establish NAVAIRSYSCOM policy with respect to conduct
of the BENDER Advanced and Engineering Development Programs
d. Provide guidance and direction to insure compliance
with the spirit and intent of reference (a)
.
2 . Background
a. By reference (a) ASN(R&D) expressed the "desire that
BENDER Weapon System design and development through prototype
test and evaluation be the direct responsibility of the Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake" and that the funds associated with
that effort be placed under the Center's "fiscal and manage-
ment control." Reference (a) further stated that the longer
term problem of pilot and follow-on procurement "should be




b. A fuller understanding and clarification of the intent
of reference (a) was achieved through follow-up discussions
with ASN(R&D) and his staff. Following those discussions
COMNAVAIR negotiated and signed an agreement with COMNAVWPNSCEN
concerning management of the Advanced and Fngineering Develop-
ment phases of the BENDER program. The signed agreement has
been approved by Chief of Naval Material and ASN(R&D). This
Agreement, inter alia, provides for the establishment of a
NAVAIR BENDER Project Office and the designation of a




a. No action shall be taken by any individual or activity
in NAVAIR-SYSCOM (Naval Air Systems Command) which contra-
venes the agreements set forth in enclosure (1)
.
b. Within the limits of resources made available and the
priorities assigned, all elements of NAVAIRSYSCOM shall render
full support to the NAVAIR BENDER Project Coordinator/Manager
and the NAVWPNSCEN BENDER Project organization.
4 . Discussion and Guidance
a. In the discussions with ASN(R&D) and his staff the
intent of reference (a) was established as requiring that
NAVAIR make an assignment of responsibility and delegation of
authority to NAVWPNSCEN such that NAVWPNSCEN could have the
greatest possible technical and management flexibility and
control in conducting the Advanced and Engineering Develop-
ment phases of the BENDER program. It should be noted that
although this assignment of responsibility and delegation
of authority closely resembles some of the earlier guided
missile and conventional weapon system developments in which
NAVWPNSCEN participated in the role of Leading Field Activity,
there is nevertheless a very important difference. Under
this new BENDER project management concept which is organi-
zationally depicted in enclosure (2) , the NAVWPNSCEN project
organization, in the person of the Development Manager, will
be responsible directly to the NAVAIR BENDER Project Coor-
dinator/Manager for the technical and administrative aspects
of the development program rather than through the normal
structure of NAVAIR Assistant Project Coordinators/Managers
and Project Support Officers. The net effect so far as the
technical aspects of the program are concerned is that all
technical direction relating to the BENDER Weapon System will





b. This is not to say, however, that Headquarters Groups
and Division personnel should not be involved in these early
phases of the BENDER development program. On the contrary,
it is emphasized that NAVAIR is now and will remain respon-
sible for the development, production and support of the
BENDER Weapon System and that the reassignment of portions
of that responsibility and delegation of related authority to
NAVWPNSCEN will in no way relieve NAVAIR and the Headquarters
Project Coordinator/Manager of his line responsibility for
assuring compliance with the program directives, requirements
and thresholds promulgated by higher management echelons. To
discharge this essential Headquarters responsibility, maintain
the required visibility into the status of the ongoing program
and perform the unique Headquarters functions as well, he will
need the assistance of an alert, Headquarters project support
team.
c. During the period when NAVWPNSCEN is directing the
design and development effort, the Headquarters team of Assis-
tant Project Coordinator/Managers and their PSO support groups
will serve in a staff capacity to the NAVAIR Project Coordi-
nator/Manager and assume the role of consultants to rather
than directors of, the NAVWPNSCEN Development Management Team.
Acting in this consultant capacity they will be expected to
establish liaison with their counterparts on the Development
Manager's team and offer constructive criticism where and when
appropriate, at the same time being careful to refrain from
attempting to force or unduly influence technical decisions
that are in fact within the purview of the responsible
NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager. Decisions concerning the
assigned development phases must, in the final analysis, be
those of the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager if, as desired by
ASN(R&D), the Center is to have an opportunity to successfully
discharge the direct responsibility assignment. There should
be no hesitancy, however, on the part of any NAVAIR team
member to advise the responsible Assistant Project Coordinator/
Manager or the Project Coordinator/Manager, as appropriate,
whenever the course of action directed by the NAVWPNSCEN
Development Manager is judged to be contrary to the approved
control documents called out in the enclosure (1) Agreement
or to the Agreement itself; or whenever, in his opinions,
such action would result in an unacceptable product, be incom-
patible with carrying aircraft systems or make it difficult
or impossible for the Headquarters team to execute the pilot








(1) Establish a BENDER Project Office and appoint a
BENDER Project Coordinator (PC) to serve as the primary con-
tact for and perforin the Headquarters management function for
the BENDER Advanced Development Program.
(2) In collaboration with NAVWPNSCEN, prepare and
issue a mutually accaptable AIRTASK which assigns responsi-
bility and delegates authority commensurate therewith for
accomplishment of the BENDER Advanced Development Program.
b. AIR-01 : When directed by AIR-00 (for planning pur-
poses not later than six to nine months prior to the first
scheduled DSARC) , initiate action to charter a NAVAIR Desig-
nated Project for BENDER, provide for a project office and
designate a BENDER Project Manager (PMA)
.
c ' AIR-05 : In collaboration with NAVWPNSCEN, prepare
and issue a mutually acceptable AIRTASK which assigns respon-
sibility and delegates authority commensurate therewith, for
accomplishment of appropriate phases (at least through proto-
type test and evaluation) of .the BENDP'R Engineering Develop-
ment Program.
d. AIR-02 , AIR-04 , AIR-0 5 : Designate to the AIR-03 PC
(Project Coordinator) and the AIR-01 PMA (Project Manager)
(see a. and b. above) Assistant Project Coordinators/Managers
and PSO (Project Support Officer) teams as necessary to
provide Headquarters staff support for the performance of
essential Headquarters project coordination/management
functions
.




COMNAVAIR - COMNAVWPNSCEN Agreement Concerning the
Advanced Development and Prototype Test and Evaluation
Programs for BENDER Guided Missile Weapon System
Ref: (a) ASN (R&D) Conf memo to CNO and CNM of 26 April 1971
In keeping with the spirit and intent of reference (a)
, Com-
mander, Naval Air Systems Command will assign responsibilities
and delegate authority to Commander, Naval Weapons Center for
the management and conduct of the Advanced Development and
Prototype design test and evaluation phases of the BENDER
Weapon System.
The purpose of this agreement is to establish the framework
of understanding within which the project effort will be
conducted.
SYSTEM DEFINITION
The BENDER Guided Missile Weapon System for which NAVWPNSCEN
will be assigned development management responsibility includes
but is not limited to the following:









a. Visual target acquisition system
b. Other Weapon Control System Elements not designed
and provided as an integral part of the using aircraft.
c. Launcher (if new development required)
d. Peculiar Ground Support Equipment
(1) For missile
(2) For Non-expendable system elements






NAVAIR will establish a BENDER Project Office as the
primary point of contact in the Naval Material Command for
the conduct of BENDER business. NAVWPNSCEN will designate a
Development Manager resident at NAVWPNSCEN who will be
responsive to the NAVAIR BENDER Project Coordinator or Manager




Data required for broad BENDER planning, such as included
in the Navy Strategic Study, tentative Program Objectives
Memorandum, Weapon System Planning Documents, Material Plan-
ning Studies, etc., will be coordinated by NAVAIR. NAVAIR
will provide such long range planning information as may be
required by NAVWPNSCEN and solicit support as may be required
for proper planning.
BUDGET PREPARATION AND PROJECT FUNDING
NAVWPNSCEN will have financial management responsibilities
for those portions of the program for which responsibility has
been assigned and will provide necessary data and cost esti-
mates for its assigned responsibilities to NAVAIR for program,
budget and review purposes. NAVAIR will have financial
management responsibility for the overall BENDER Weapon
System Project.
NAVAIR will prepare, review, justify and defend program-
ming, budget and apportionment estimates for the total BENDER
Program. As appropriate and required, NAVWPNSCEN representa-
tives will be called upon to supply data and provide back-up
witnesses
.
The entire amount of project funds required and apportioned
for support of the NAVWPNSCEN effort previously agreed to by
both parties and expressed in the current version of the devel-
opment plan will be made available to NAVWPNSCEN in a single







NAVWPNSCEN will be responsible for the preparation and
updating of the following essential documents
:
(1) The Technical Development Plan (Adv. Dev.) - (Appli-
cable to Concept Formulation (Validation) effort and
Engineering Development Planning)
.
(2) The Technical Development Plan (TDP) - (Applicable
to Engineering Development. One of the major outputs
of the Advanced Development Program)
.
(3) The Advanced Procurement Plan (APP) - (Covers all
contemplated contractual actions for the entire pro-
gram span up to and including first competitive
reprocurement or first volume procurement, whichever
is sooner)
.
(4) The Performance Specification - (Performance specifi-
cations for the system, major subsystems and elements
of the system to be developed and prototyped as GFE
items are required as an output of the Validation
effort and prior to release to prototype procurement)
(5) The Development Concept Paper - (Draft and review as
required)
.
The above items will be prepared by NAVWPNSCEN and sub-
mitted through NAVAIR and updated on a timely basis. Items
1, 2, 3 and 4 are subject to NAVAIR concurrence or approval
as appropriate. All items will be used as program control
documents
.
Requirements for the preparation of these documents will
be delineated in the applicable AIRTASK assignments.
INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION
Developments of hardware or software for service use
,
beginning with the prototype program, will be accomplished by
NAVWPNSCEN or participating field activities working with and
through industrial concerns capable of producing the quality-
and quantity of hardware needed for service use, at the
desired rates. This industrial participation will be such
that at the initiation of the prototype phase one of the par-
ticipants can be designated as the weapon system or system







(1) evolve the production baseline configuration of
the so-called contractor furnished portions of
the weapon system.
(2) Participate in the performance of the system inte-
gration function by assisting in the development,
establishment and management of total system con-
figuration and the maintenance of CFE-to-GFE and
weapon system-to-aircraft and carrier interfaces.
The items of equipment and software to be developed
as GFE will be determined by NAVWPNSCFN and treated
appropriately in the APP. The number of such items
will be held to a practical minimum.
CONTRACTING
Contracting for all procurements undertaken in support of
the development program through the prototype phase will be
accomplished by NAVWPNSCEN using procedures and contracting
offices of their own choosing. Source selection will be
accomplished by NAVWPNSCFN in accordance v/ith CNM approved
procedures. Final selection .of contractors for prototype
production must be concurred in by NAVAIR before announcement.
A designated representative of the NAVAIR Project Coordinator/
Manager will participate in all selections of prototype
equipment contractors as a member of the source selection
evaluation board or its equivalent.
DATA ACQUISITION
The end product of the NAVWPNSCEN-managed development
program will be a proven prototype data package which will
provide for or support
a. A release to Pilot Production by the Prototype
contractor
b. Inspection and acceptance of pilot production end items
c. Installation in test and evaluation aircraft
d. Operation by test and evaluation personnel
e. Maintenance and repair by Navy test and evaluation
organizations
The NAVAIR Project Coordinator/Manager will validate this






Configuration Control for the advanced development period
will be against the stated objectives of the ADO (Advanced
Development Objective) . For the early engineering development
period beginning with prototype procurement and extending to
the point of release to pilot production or delivery of first
hardware for NTE, whichever is sooner, control will be against
the performance specification or functional baseline estab-
lished in the advanced development (validation) program. The
configuration control for pilot production will be against the
product baseline disclosure provided in the release to pilot
production. Deviations from the baseline configurations de-
lineated above will require the prior approval of the NAVAIR
Project Coordinator/Manager.
LIAISON
a. Intro-Project Liaison. All visits to participating
field activities and contractors by personnel other than those
reporting directly to the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will
be coordinated with the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager prior
to their occurrence.
b. Inter-Service Technical Liaison . The NAVWPNSCEN
Development Manager will conduct direct liaison with the Air
Force on technical matters and will provide facilities for
local Air Force liaison and/or technical representatives. All
project action requirements levied upon the Air Force in the
course of this development will be implemented with the con-
currence of the NAVAIR Project Coordinator/Manager.
c. Liaison with Higher Authorities . NAVAIR will provide
primary liaison with CNM, OPNAV, SECNAV, OSD and Congress
relative to management of, and progress reporting on the BENDER
Project. The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will be called
upon to supply information and provide back-up support. He
will provide technical presentations, as appropriate.
d. Liaison with Aircraft and Related Equipment Contractors ,
The NAVAIR Project Coordinator/Manager will arrange for access
of appropriate NAVWPNSCEN Project personnel to NAVAIR contrac-
tors for aircraft and related equipment and will take all
steps necessary to assure early detection of compatibility






The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will prepare and keep
current, a detailed cost estimate for the complete develop-
ment, test and evaluation program and will assist NAVAIR in
the generation and update of production cost estimates. The
cost model used for these estimates will be worked out in
conjunction with and approved by the NAVAIR Project Coordina-
tor/Manager.
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS SUPPORT
The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will coordinate all
logistic support management planning and implementation with
NAVAIR based on the procedures of NAVAIR Instruction 4000.2.
He will provide a cochairman for the ILSMT (Integrated Logis-
tics Support Management Team) constituted by NAVAIR.
CORRESPONDENCE
The NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager will provide the NAVAIR
Project Coordinator/Manager with copies of pertinent corres-
pondence between and among participating field activities,
contractors and the Development Manager. The NAVAIR Project
Coordinator/Manager will provide the Development Manager with
correspondence and reports judged to be useful and/or desir-
able to the Development Manager.
REPORTING
a * Routing . A systematic, periodic reporting method will
be established by the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager to indi-
cate progress of the BENDER development program in relation to
the pre-established technical, fiscal and schedule milestones.
Insofar as possible, such reports will be those used by the
Development Manager.
b. Special
. Special reports will be needed by the NAVAIR
Project Coordinator/Manager from time to time to meet special
requirements. Such reports will be provided by the NAVWPNSCEN
Development Manager on a mutually agreed upon basis.
c. Technical . Periodic technical reviews will be scheduled
by the NAVWPNSCEN Development Manager at least every fourth
month at which time the technical status of the program will
be discussed in detail. The NAVAIR Project Coordinator/Manager










Naval Air Systems Command
APPROVED
Chief of Naval Material Assistant Secretary
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In order to obtain the greatest benefit from the BENDER
Cases, the student should have a general familiarity with the
system life cycle, DOD System Acquisition Process, DOD
Directive 5000.1, and the basic principles of good manage-
ment. This knowledge not only aids the student in following
the scenario, but also gives him a good reference for analyz-
ing the problems interspersed throughout the cases.
The field development concept is an underlying issue
throughout both cases. It is the root of the problem in the
Organizational case and its possible termination is the
result of the Management Review case. What is field develop-
ment? How does it differ from the normal project management
concept? Is it a valid concept for the future? These are
important questions that students might ask while digging
into the issues of both cases. There is no single answer to
any of these questions, but an understanding of the field
development concept is important to grasp the underlying
issues of both cases.
In general terms field development is a decentralized
form of project management in which a field activity has
direct responsibility for the development of a specific
weapon system. In order to better understand the implications
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of this, a comparison will be made between the field develop-
ment concept and the normal development concept.
In a normal systems command/field activity project a dual
organization is formed - one at the field activity and one
at the systems command. The systems command project organ-
ization includes the project manager and his project officers.
In most cases the project manager makes all the major decisions
while the project support officers direct project work in their
area of expertise - contracts, material acquisition, and
logistics. Under the field development concept there are two
major differences. First, the authority and responsibility
of project management is vested in the development manager at
the field activity and secondly, the project support groups
assume the role of consultants to rather than directors of
the field activity development management team. It is impor-
tant to remember that in either case the technical job of
weapons system development is accomplished at the field
activity and thus , field development simply means that the
field activity has management as well as technical responsi-
bility for the program.
Another issue pertinent to both cases is the management
capability within the Navy Laboratory system. Of the many
reasons put forth for field development, many contend that
one of the main reasons is to increase the management cap-
ability within the laboratories. The instructor may find
that the class is divided in its faith in the field develop-
ment concept. Much of this difference of opinion may center
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around the management capability of the Navy Laboratory
system being largely untested. Those in favor of field
development will probably restate many of the reasons brought
out in the Organizational Case to support their arguments
while those against may bring up the existence of a proven
source of management capability within the systems commands.
Those against may also point out that the Navy may not be able
to afford such a duplication of resources in the future.
What ever the point of view it is necessary to look at some
alternatives: that is, move all programs to the field and
eliminate much of the systems commands bureaucracy, eliminate
field development, or some other approach. From an academic
standpoint many things are possible. What the students should
consider is whether or not the alternative is viable in the
"real world.
"
B. ORGANIZATIONAL CASE DISCUSSION
The instructor may desire to discuss this question after
both cases have been presented since additional problems are
developed in the Management Review Case.
1. Discuss the problems facing Dr. Williams. What recom-
mendations would you make?
The basic problem facing Dr. Williams is that he is an
engineer and not a trained manager. As a result, his views
of project management (scope and depth) are obviously biased.
He attacks the management problems like the engineering
problems - find a good man and assign him to work on it. Un-
fortunately effective management does not work that way. It
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cannot be delegated and must be practiced at all levels
within the project. As far as Dr. Williams is concerned, he
should select a deputy development manager with management
expertise to complement his own weaknesses in this area.
Probably this was part of his motive in selecting Joe Stern
as his Management Programs and Plans Branch Manager. Unfor-
tunately Joe was assigned at too low a level in the project
to be effective and in addition, it seems that he also was
more of an engineer than a manager. Whether or not this is
true, the fact still remains that he has not done his job
effectively and must be replaced. A workable solution would
be for Dr. Williams to have a deputy to assist him and a
branch manager to handle such matters as program documentation
and financial management.
Another problem facing Dr. Williams is the lack of a pro-
ject information system. Basic to this is a meaningful work
breakdown structure with appropriate cost and schedule budgets
for each work package. While Dr. Williams may feel confident
that his engineers are cost conscious, this will not satisfy
Washington - they must have the facts. In developing this
information system Dr. Williams must impress upon his engineers
the importance of their data as inputs. In the past they have
felt any such effort was a waste of time; however, a key to
selling the program in Washington is timely accurate
information.
Dr. Williams reports two levels below the station techni-
cal director in the NWC organization. While BENDER is not a
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designated NAVAIR Project, it is a major DOD Program in the
sense of DOD Directive 5000.1. When project personnel were
asked about this they felt it was not a serious problem in
light of the informal environment at NWC and especially-
considering all the attention provided by the Technical
Director. Hopefully a change in technical directors will not
alter this policy; however, the question of the project
manager having direct access to top management remains.
Obviously the most pressing problem facing Dr. Williams
is that BENDER is not presenting a united front in Washington.
He and CAPT Hoffman are not working well together and quite
simply the program is suffering because of inadequate repre-
sentation to top management. In fact is seems reasonable to
assume that many of Dr. Williams' problems with Washington
could have been avoided or at least reduced had the develop-
ment manager and the project coordinator been working as a
team from the beginning. A good example would be the numerous
budget cuts suffered as a result of top management frustration
with the BENDER Program. The time is at hand for Dr. Williams
to "bite the bullet" and work out a solution with CAPT Hoffman,
In essence, the project coordinator must quit trying to run
the program and in return the project must make a concerted
effort to keep him "up to speed" on the latest developments.
If this approach proves infeasible Dr. Williams should solicit




2. Evaluate the BENDER situation in terms of top manage-
ment desires (SECDEF, SECNAV, and CNO) , DOD Directive 5000.1,
and the principles of good management. What recommendations
would you make?
The present situation is the result of ineffective decen-
tralization. On the one hand top management sees decentral-
ization as a way for better system acquisition and on the
other hand NAVAIR is the typical manager reluctant to delegate,
The reasons for decentralization and thus the field develop-
ment concept have been discussed earlier in the case problem
and will not be repeated here. In analyzing NAVAIR 's reluc-
tance to decentralize it is important to keep in mind that
prior to the reorganization in 1966 the system commands had
chain-of-command authority over their cognizant field activi-
ties. Since then they have taken on a customer relationship
and now through field development are being ordered to let
the laboratories have the "whole ball of wax, "while they
still retain the overall responsibility for the acquisition
of the weapon system. In addition, the laboratories have
simply not had program management experience in terms of
major systems acquisition. At this point the problem for the
laboratories is all too familiar: "You cannot have the job
until you get the experience and you cannot get the experience
without the job."
It was in this environment that the NAVAIR-NWC implement-
ing agreement was written. Its drafters maintain that it is
vague and ambiguous of necessity to allow the parties latitude
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within which to work. However, another possible argument is
that it was written to satisfy the desires of the endorsers
(ASN(R&D), NAVMAT, COMNAVAIR, and COMNAVWPNSCEN) . This latter
thought becomes more convincing when the agreement is read in
light of the decentralization principle of functional defini-
tion. It simply says that individuals do a better job when
they have a clear understanding of results expected, activities
to be undertaken, and organizational authority delegated.
These ideas are in agreement with DOD Directive 5000.1 which
states that "Key factors in successful system acquisition are
competent people, rational priorities and clearly defined
responsibilities." In addition the directive requires that
acquisition programs be managed by a single individual with
sufficient authority to do the job. The other pertinent
provisions of the directive apply equally well and were
previously mentioned in the case problem.
While the effectiveness of the implementing agreement can
be argued with varying degrees of success, that is not the
point. The job is to develop a missile system within the
guidelines laid down by ASN(R&D) and any resultant situation
contrary to this requires change. The big problem seems to
be the project coordinator and his relationship with the
BENDER project organization. NAVAIR's position is clear -
they need some form of control over BENDER and CAPT Hoffman
is it. Unfortunately, according to the management diagram
shown in the case problem, this amounts to one man (the
Development Manager) reporting to one man (the Project
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Coordinator) . This seldom works out unless one is subordinate
to the other as in a Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
relationship and this is definitely not the case with Dr.
Williams and CAPT Hoffman. Clearly the arrangement is too
dependent upon personalities and no organization can operate
effectively in this environment. In addition, control of a
major program from 3000 miles is difficult to impossible for
one man. Of the many alternatives, three seem to stand out
as being the most workable. The first is to eliminate the
job of project coordinator and assign a project manager from
NAVAIR to head the development effort at NWC with the develop-
ment manager as his assistant. The second is to clarify the
project coordinator's authority and relationship with the
development manager . This would include providing him with a
staff and the development of a project support officer
organization within the various functional groups at NAVAIR.
The final alternative is to discontinue the field development
concept as far as BENDER is concerned.
C. MANAGEMENT REVIEW CASE DISCUSSION
Part One
1. In light of DOD Directive 5000.1 what impact will the
major decisions, particularly those relating to the funding
reduction, have on preparation for the Management Review?
From the case the student might pick up an idea that the
upcoming Management Review may in fact be more than a Manage-
ment Review. It is possible that in getting the decision to
proceed into Advanced Development in the manner they did,
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BENDER may have created a situation on the DDR&E Staff and
within other department staffs in OSD in which people are
somewhat unhappy with BENDER. This brings up the point of
what type environment will BENDER be giving this presentation.
After considering the environment Dr. Williams and Mr. Lee
must consider the impact of decisions made as a result of the
funding reduction. For example, is the decision to pick one
guidance/seeker approach contrary to DOD Directive 5000.1's
intent of carrying alternatives for high risk components?
From various comments within the case it should be possible
for the student to recognize that the guidance/seeker unit
is indeed a high risk unit. Also a very debatable point is
to what degree has the project reduced its Test and Evaluation
(T&E) program. Personnel within BENDER contend that all it
amounted to was a shift in emphasis from flight testing to
ground testing and that there was still sufficient flight
tests to adequately prove BENDER' s capability. DDR&E person-
nel would appear to not be satisfied with the T&E program,
at least in view of paragraph 3 of Exhibit (IV-4). In fact
conversations with BENDER personnel about that paragraph seem
to indicate that it is going to result in only minor changes
in the existing T&E program.
The most important point to consider in this area is the
impact of the reduction in the development effort on the
Dynamic BENDER. This was initially requested by NAVAIR so
it is therefore necessary to consider what they might have
considered as a viable back-up to a high risk system. (It
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is even possible that they might not have considered the
Vectored BENDER as being high risk.) The only apparent pos-
sible fall-back position would be reliance on the improved
RATTLER. This may bring up the side issue of parallel
development - is parallel development a viable alternative
in today's environment?
2. What are some of the major points that must be con-
sidered by the project staff in preparing for the Management
Review?
Exhibit (IV-1) will give the student a good idea of the
management topics that must be covered. It is necessary to
realize that many of those in OSD may not believe that NWC
has the management capability to handle a program of this
size. Therefore, in preparation for the review it is neces-
sary to build an effective marketing pitch for keeping man-
agement responsibility at NWC . For the technical portion it
is necessary the program staff realize that if there exists
any technical problem areas that OSD is probably aware they
exist. Therefore, they had better be able to give a realistic
plan for solving these problems.
Another approach that might be taken is one that is some-
what more positive. That is, to approach the upcoming review
with the concept of what do we, the BENDER Program, want to
get out of this review. This could possibly be a much more
effective approach than the previous one. It is almost
certain to generate more enthusiasm within the program in




1. Would you interpret this memorandum to indicate the
end of the field development concept?
Look at paragraph l.c of Exhibit (IV-4). This would seem
to indicate so. But the student must recognize that not
every memorandum is implemented exactly as would seem to be
obvious. In this case a project office might be established
within NAVAIR but that might not necessarily mean the end of
field development. That would depend on how the actual day
to day decisions are really handled. In any case a project
manager in NAVAIR with 3000 miles between him and the project
he is managing will still probably have trouble. To further
complicate his job he does not have a formal contract with
NWC like he would with a regular development contractor, to
insure they do what he says. Overall now that NWC has had
a taste of independent development (i.e. being responsible
for management of the development program) it may be diffi-
cult to ever return the entire management responsibility to
NAVAIR.
2. What do you think the impact of this memorandum will
be on the BENDER Program?
This question should enable the student to explore a wide
range of possibilities. Some three months after the memoran-
dum was written it has just reached ASN(R&D)'s Office. It
is therefore too early to tell how it will be implemented.
So far the knowledge of what the memorandum says has had very
little effect on the day to day operations of the BENDER
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Program. The Program Staff at NWC do contend that when the
official memorandum with implementing instructions finally
reaches NWC it will have very little actual effect on the
way things are currently operating.
One thing that has happened as a result of the Management
Review was the BENDER Program Staff found out that it must
now take seriously an Air Force effort to develop a compet-
ing short-range air-to-air missile. Previously, due to
inadequate information, BENDER had tended to believe in the
statement of DEPSECDEF on development of only one missile
for joint service use. The thing that the BENDER staff
failed to recognize was that the Air Force missile was much
less costly and much lighter than BENDER and also that the
Air Force may not necessarily feel they need BENDFR on its
new fighter. The BENDER Program is very concerned about
getting a commitment from the Air Force to buy BENDER because
a larger production run can significantly reduce the unit
production cost. The Air Force seems to come across with
the feeling "don't push me. If I like the production version
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